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Summary findings
Many developing countries faced macroeconomic shocks  a temporary  reduction in aggregate demand is inevitable
in the 1980s and  1990s. The impact of the shocks on  but as soon as a sustainable external balance has been
welfare depended on the nature of the shock, on initial  reached and inflationary pressures have been contained,
household and community conditions, and on policy  macroeconomic policy should be eased (interest rates
responses.  reduced and efficient public spending restored, to help
To avoid severe and lasting losses to poor  and  offset the worst effects of the recession on the poor). A
vulnerable groups, governments and civil society need to  fiscal stimulus directed at labor-intensive activities (such
be prepared for a flexible response well ahead of the  as building rural roads) can combine the benefits of
crisis.  growth with those of income support for poor groups,
A key component  of a flexibly responsive system is an  for example.
effective permanent  safety net, which will typically  *  Key areas of public spending should be protected,
combine a workfare program with targeted transfers and  especially investments in health care, education, rural
credit.  infrastructure,  urban sanitation,  and microfinance.
Once a crisis has happened, several things should be  *  Efforts should be made to preserve the social fabric
done:  and build social capital.
* Macroeconomic policies should aim to achieve  *  Sound information should be generated on the
stabilization goals at the least cost to the poor. Typically,  welfare impacts of the crisis.
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Macroeconomic crises vary in nature, causes and intensity.  In this article we define a
macroeconomic crisis  as any  episode characterized by either  (a) a  decline in  gross  national
product  (GNP) over the  12-month period from the  onset of crisis; or (b)  a  doubling in the
country's  monthly rate of inflation to above 40% per annum at any point within that 12-month
period; or (c) both. Very few economic 'normal'  downturns in OECD economies would match
those criteria. By contrast, many developing countries have experienced such crises over the last
two decades.
In the 1980s, oil price rises, large scale international borrowing, and the debt crisis that
followed, plunged many countries across the developing world into macroeconomic crises. And
in the mid- and late 1990s - just  as the memory of the debt crises was beginning to fade-  a
new spate  of  crises spread  from Mexico (1995),  through  South East Asia  (1997/8),  Russia
(1998), and returned to Latin America in Brazil (1999). No two crises are the same, but the crises
of the 1980s and those of the 1990s did share some important features.  They were preceded by
large increases in the current account deficit, often accompanied by rising fiscal deficits. At some
point, fear of default or devaluation prompts a cessation in the capital inflows financing those
deficits (loans in the 1980s; portfolio flows in the 1990s).
A sharp contraction in capital inflows requires the country to reduce expenditures and to
switch domestic demand towards non-tradables (and production towards tradables). Expenditure
reduction is accomplished through contractionary fiscal and/or monetary policies, which lead to a
recession.  Expenditure switching  is  accomplished through  a  devaluation,  which  may  have
additional impacts on  the level of aggregate demand.  These impacts  vary depending on  the
degree  of  exposure  of  the  financial  system  (and  corporate  sector)  to  foreign-currency
denominated loans, as well as on labor market rigidities that may slow the flow of productive
resources  across  sectors.  The  combination of  expenditure reduction  and  switching  policies
(which can be accomplished in many different ways) is the process of stabilization. The typical
package of policy responses to the crisis also includes a number of microeconomic and structural
reforms intended to raise the efficiency of resource allocation and the effectiveness of institutions
2(trade liberalization and privatization were key examples in the  1980s; financial sector reform
and privatization are examples in the 1990s).
The specific policy responses to crises have varied considerably from country to country.
But a  few factors are, once again, common: one  way or another, a  real depreciation  of the
currency is achieved. One way or another, aggregate demand is reduced. And alas, one way or
another, the living standards of many groups of people - almost invariably including the poorest
- decline for some period of time. This article considers the impact of macroeconomic crises and
of policy responses on the poor. The article makes four main points:
*  Crises, and the subsequent policy responses, do not  affect all households  identically.
Impacts vary across sector of employment, level of wealth, geographic location, gender,
and according to various idiosyncratic factors.
*  To protect  the poor  during a  crisis, these  impacts have to  be  taken  into account.  A
comprehensive safety net will typically require more than one type of program.  And it
will need to  adapt flexibly to differing household circumstances and potentially  rapid
changes over time.
*  Whether policy responses that protect the poor can be chosen and implemented depends
in part on the political situation in a country.
*  Since it is often difficult to react at short notice during a crisis,  a country's ability to
protect the poor improves considerably if appropriate safety nets are set up before a crisis
hits.  This helps avoid providing too much assistance too late, as often happens.  The
safety net  will  be  less  active at  normal times,  and  some  components  may  well  be
dormant,  though ready to  come into action  when needed.  A permanent capacity  to
protect the poor requires a conscious effort, as periods of good performance often breed
complacency.
The following section describes the main channels of impact on the poor of crises and the
policies designed to respond to them. Building on this section, the rest of the article outlines an
agenda for action. Section 3 discusses the importance of having a  safety-net system  in place
before any crisis  - a  safety net that is capable both of dealing with normal demand and  of
3responding adequately to the increased needs during crisis periods.  Section 4 considers pro-poor
policy responses once a crisis has begun.  Section 5 concludes.
2.  CHANNELS  OF IMPACT
Crises, and the policy responses that follow them, have different impacts on different
groups of people.  The effects are not the same on farmers and construction workers; on people
holding local currency assets and on people holding US dollars; on women and men; on the poor
and on the rich; or on different ethnic groups.  Some lose a lot, some lose less, some gain.  Even
if the poor do not systematically lose proportionately more than other groups - which is an open
question, and varies from crisis to crisis, from country to country' - there are good reasons to be
more concemed with the effect on the poor: one baht or rouble lost to someone hardly able to
afford food and basic shelter has a more dramatic effect on welfare than the same amount lost to
a rich compatriot.
When a macroeconomic crisis hits, there are several channels through which its impacts
are felt by households (Ferreira and Keely, 1999; Lustig and Walton, 1998). These can be traced
to the different sources of household income - wages, salaries, and self-employment incomes;
returns on physical assets; and the receipt of public transfers - and to the prices a household
faces when purchasing goods and services. There are also effects at the level  of the broader
community, which matter in turn to  individual welfare. To focus the mind, we group these
various effects into five (overlapping) channels:
1. Relative  price  changes.  Shocks (such as an exchange rate depreciation or commodity
price changes) and policies (such as trade reforms, public sector price increases, and tax/subsidy
changes) affect relative prices. These price changes alter the profitability  of each sector, and
affect relative wages and employment levels. The relative prices of consumer goods also change
with a further effect on real incomes.  Strong predictions are possible in some special cases.  For
example, a real devaluation (such as one induced by a fiscal contraction) implies that the prices
of the goods that are traded must rise relative to those of non-traded goods.  If the poor are net
suppliers of traded (non-traded) goods, or tend to work in industries producing them, then they
will gain (lose) from the fiscal contraction via the change in relative prices.  However, the story
4in reality is complicated by a variety of factors, including impediments to labor mobility, price
stickiness, effects on the structure of consumer prices, and direct welfare effects on the poor of
the spending cuts (Lipton and Ravallion, section 5.3).
In East Asia, the prices of imported goods increased dramatically following exchange rate
devaluations.  Price increases for food hurt those households that are net consumers of food -
especially the urban poor and poor farmers whose food stocks and production went down due to
the El Nifno  drought.  Evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that the real devaluations of the
late 1980s and early 1  990s benefited the large numbers of the rural poor who were net producers
of tradables (Sahn et. al, 1997).
2.  Changes  in  labor  demand.  An important short-run impact  on households  is  via
reduced  labor  demand.  This  follows  from  contractionary  policies  which  reduce  aggregate
demand for goods and services, thus impacting factor demand. The adjustment can be through
quantities:  layoffs;  reduced  working  hours;  increased  unemployment  and  informal  self-
employment; or through prices: lower wages for wage earners and lower earnings due to reduced
demand for the products of rural or urban enterprises. These shocks have different impacts on
workers with different skills and different levels of job security.  Low-skill workers and women
are often  more likely  to  lose  formal-sector jobs  and move  into the  informal  sector,  where
earnings are likely to decline.
A  corollary of the importance of the effects of declines in  aggregate demand on the
welfare of the poor - through labor markets - is that rapid recovery is likely to be crucial in
mitigating the negative impact of a crisis.  See, for example, Morley (1995) on the evidence for
Latin America in the 1980s.
In  both  Brazil  and  Mexico,  for  example,  informal  sector  employment  swelled  and
earnings declined  during the  recessions  of the  early  1980s.  In  Brazil,  employment  in  the
informal sector increased by 30 percent during 1981-83, while the ratio of informal to formal
sector wages decreased by 7 percent.  In Mexico, informal sector employment grew 9.5 percent a
year between 1983 and 1988 (World Bank, 1995); the formal sector also suffered from the shock:
5during the recent Mexican recession, formal sector wages declined almost as far as  informal
wages.
In  Cote d'Ivoire, the adjustment program which began in  1980 was accompanied  by
massive layoffs in the formal private sector and in the public sector  - formal sector employment
decreased by 36 percent between 1980 and 1985  - with unskilled and young workers taking the
brunt of the layoffs (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1992).
In East Asia, unemployment increased significantly - in Thailand from 2.1 percent in
February 1997 to 5.3 percent in May 1998; and from around 2 percent up to July 1997 to about 8
percent in February 1999 in Korea.  In Indonesia and Malaysia most of the adjustment appears to
have taken place through falling wages and the movement of workers into low-paying informal
sector jobs (Manuelyan Atinc and Walton, 1998).
3. Returns on physical assets and capital gains or losses.  Changes in interest rates and
bond prices, stock market crashes, falling real estate prices, and inflation all affect the incomes of
people who own these various types of assets. While changes in the relative short-term returns to
holding bonds versus stocks may redistribute income only  among the non-poor, tlhere is one
major asset-type impact which affects the poor: inflation. The rate of inflation is a tax on money
holdings. Because there are barriers to entry in most markets for non-money financial assets, the
poor are constrained in their ability to adjust their portfolio to rises in inflation. Typically, they
will hold  a greater proportion of their wealth in cash during inflationary episodes than do the
non-poor.
The non-poor are generally better able to protect their living standards from inflationary
shocks than  the  poor.  Since  Independence, inflationary  periods  in  India  have  resulted  in
temporarily higher poverty incidence, depth and severity (Datt and Ravallion, 1998).  For Brazil,
inflation has been an important macroeconomic force driving the observed increase in inequality
during the 1980s; the effect of inflation, controlling for unemployment, was to reduce the income
share of the lowest eight deciles and to increase the share of the top two deciles (Ferreira and
Litchfield, 1998).  Blejer and Guerrero (1990) reach a similar conclusion for the Philippines for
the period 1980-1986.  Easterly and Fischer (1999) present evidence from a variety of sources
(including subjective assessments of the importance of inflation) indicating that inflation matters
6more to the poor than the rich, who are presumably in a better position to protect their living
standards.
4. Public transfers.  Public expenditure cuts, beyond causing declines in labor demand
and price  effects (for  example, when  subsidies are removed), affect  cash transfers  and  the
provision of in-kind services. Especially if they take place across the board or are ad-hoc, these
cuts  tend to  harm those  who rely  on public  services, often including  the  poor.  Doubtful
inferences have often been drawn from benefit incidence studies showing that the poor share
relatively little in the average benefits from social spending. Yet the marginal gains and losses
from fiscal contraction can readily yield a very different picture (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999,
using data for India).  In Chile, per capita social spending fell by 20 percent between 1981 and
1986.  The poorest 40 percent of families were particularly hard hit: their  share of personal
income  was only  12 percent but  they received 50 percent  of public spending  in  health  and
education and 20 percent of social security payments (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1992).
5. Community environment effects. Impacts are felt not just by individual households, but
by whole communities, as traditional ties and networks and other forms of social  capital are
disrupted because of economic hardship, migration, and the emergence of fault lines between
different ethnic, religious, or racial groups.  There is evidence from several countries that social
capital can be damaged during crises.  Religious and ethnic tensions and riots in Indonesia are
one example.  In a different context, there is evidence from participatory poverty assessments
that economic hardship has severely eroded family and community ties in the countries of the
former Soviet Union.
As incomes fall and poverty and unemployment rise, crime and other types of violence -
including  domestic  violence  - tend  to  become  more  pervasive. 2 Similarly,  cuts  in  public
expenditure on sanitation, garbage collection and other services can lead to  a deterioration in
hygiene and public health conditions in poor neighborhoods. A number of cholera outbreaks in
Latin America in the 1980s was widely linked to worsening public health conditions in the wake
of stringent budgetary austerity.
Households respond to these shocks in various ways.  Consumption patterns change in
response to price changes. Production levels change across sectors. Employment patterns change:
7children are pulled out of school and sent to work; people turn to informal sector jobs. In some
cases, poor women increase their labor force participation in response to a decline in the income
of the main household earner. (See Beyer, 1995, for some evidence of this in Chile, during the
1993/4 slowdown.)  Individuals and families migrate.  Savings and other assets are tapped into,
and so are forms of assistance available through family, kin, and communities.
Some of these responses have only short-term welfare effects, but some have more long-
term and irreversible impacts.  For example, both price effects and the reduction  in access to
public  health and education may severely limit the ability of the poor to  accumulate human
capital, which in turn may have irreversible effects on long-term productivity.  Reducing the
nutritional intake of babies or pulling children out of school can have permanent effects on their
future learning and income-earning abilities; malnourished mothers are more likely to give birth
to  low-birth-weight children, who in turn are more likely to suffer from poor health.  Distress
sales  of productive  assets can readily affect the  ability of households to  resume productive
activities  after  the  crisis.  Responses such  as  these  - though  perfectly rational  given the
constraints  facing the  poor  - can have  long-term effects  and  may well  reinforce  existing
inequalities, thus creating persistent poverty (Ferreira, 1995).
Evidence  from  rapid  social  assessments  conducted  in  Thailand,  the  Philippines,
Indonesia, and Cambodia, and surveys in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand confirm that the poor
are indeed responding in ways which will affect their long-term well-being: youngsters are being
taken out of secondary school and sent to work; health care is delayed or forgone, with increased
risks of epidemics of communicable diseases; malnutrition is spreading; and productive assets
are being sold. 3 There is also  anecdotal evidence of reverse migration from the cities  to the
countryside.
The ability of the poor to participate in the recovery can be severely hampered by these
rational short-term responses to a crisis.  Evidence from Latin America indicates that the effects
of the  mid-1980s crisis  on poverty were  sharp. In some  cases, the  losses were  not  quickly
reversed with the resumption of growth because inequality was also increasing.  In Mexico, the
acquisition of education was dampened both by a reduction in the rate of enrollment of  first
entrants in primary school and by a smaller share of people continuing on to higher levels of
schooling.  This may explain why in the mid-1990s average years of schooling of households
8heads were lower for all deciles up to the seventh than those of 1984, and why inequalities in
earnings persisted (Lustig, 1995).
3.  BETTER  SAFE THAN  SORRY:  PREPARING  FOR CRISES
Economy-wide or localized crises will always be with us. Responses that protect the poor
will be easier to design if more is understood about the distributional impacts of crises, and if
mechanisms to protect the poor are built into long-term development strategies.
(a) Understanding distributional impacts
More work is needed to develop analytical approaches and gather empirical evidence on
the distributional impacts of crises and adjustment, and on what causes households to move out
of poverty or fall back into it.  This topic is a substantial research challenge for the future.
The main class of analytical instruments used for this kind of analysis so far has been
applied and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.  These models describe the structure
of an economy on both the production and the consumption sides, often distinguishiing between
socioeconomic groups, and generating estimates of the impacts of shocks and policy responses. 4
The  findings  are  often  very  sensitive  to  the  assumptions  underlying  the  models,  so  their
reliability as a guide for policy decisions is not uncontroversial.
Another, explicitly partial-equilibrium but substantially more transparent approach is to
endogenize a  small set of key factor prices - notably real wage rates  - by modeling their
relationship with other prices directly affected by the shock and/or policy response. Using time
series data on the chosen variables, one can predict the impact of contemporaneous price changes
on  wages.  For  instance,  Ravallion (1990)  uses  time  series  data  on  wages  and  prices  in
Bangladesh to predict real wage changes induced by external trade liberalization, and combines
this with cross-section household survey data so as to estimate the first-order welfare impacts at
various levels of living.
There is now a range of regression-based micro-simulation tools that offer an alternative
to  CGEs in evaluating the effect  of policy responses. Earnings and  labor force participation
9equations (at a minimum) can be estimated for various sectors, on unit-record household survey
data supplemented by time series data when available. An investigation of how previous crises
(or those  in  other countries) have affected parameters in these equations is  used to  suggest
simulations that lead to different hypothetical distributions of income for different shocks and
policy responses (Bourguignon et al., forthcoming). While this  is a  promising new research
avenue, it is still in its infancy.
A pre-requisite for any of these approaches to provide useful insights is higher-quality
and  more  timely  information  on  transmission  channels  and  household  responses.  Such
information  would  have  to  come not  just  from  standard household  surveys  but  also  from
participatory  studies, which can provide rapid feedback on the dynamics of poverty.  Despite
reasonably good overall poverty monitoring systems, the response in East Asia was hampered by
the lack of short-term information on the impact of the crisis. Short- and long-term monitoring
tools should be developed as part of a long-term development strategy.
(b) Setting up safety nets
Developing a better  understanding of the distributional impacts  of  shocks and policy
responses helps ensure that appropriate safety nets are in place to assist households in reducing
or mitigating the risks they face. 5 Earlier crises in Latin America and the current experience in
East Asia, as  well as  famines and natural disasters  in Asia and elsewhere, offer two related
lessons. Firstly, existing safety net mechanisms are too  often inadequate.  Their coverage  is
limited and leakage is high, or the assistance available is far below demand durinig a crisis;
moreover, the poor are often unaware of the programs or have too little influence to obtain what
they are entitled to.
Secondly, it is often difficult setting up effective safety nets during a crisis.  Govermnents
are often unprepared, ill informed and slow to take action; financial resources are not available,
and human resources stretched.  Building up the infrastructure and the capacity to manage  a
program takes time.
Without an adequate safety net in place before a crisis hits, the poor are likely to be hurt
disproportionately. So setting up safety nets in good times may be the only effective way to
10protect the poor during lean times.  Recent experience also calls for a re-examination of the
distinction between "relief' programs and regular "development" programs. Before a crisis, good
safety nets  can provide the insurance necessary for (highly credit-constrained) households to
make risky choices that increase their productivity and spur growth.  Safety nets can help ensure
that  crises  do  not  halt  development - that  essential  household  investments  in  health  and
education, which are crucial for both current welfare and future growth, are maintained, and that
the poor do not divest from physical capital upon which their productivity depends to  finance
consumption. Thus, an effective safety net for the poor should be seen as a long-term investment.
An important objective of a safety net is to help insure the poor against the risk of income
loss.  The safety net is just  one element of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy. Other
elements address achieving economic growth and investing in human capital; the comparative
advantage of the  safety nets  is  to  provide  insurance.  The poor  frequently rely  on  informal
insurance mechanisms including strategies to reduce or diversify risk, but these characteristically
entail high costs to longer-term prospects of escaping poverty. The key issue for policy is not
whether publicly provided safety nets displace existing private mechanisms, but whether they
provide insurance more efficiently and equitably; if they do, then displacement is desirable.
The safety net should respond flexibly to the needs of the poor, and not rely heavily on
administrative discretion.  If a safety net does not provide benefits to those who need them when
a shock hits  - for example, because it does not reach the intended beneficiaries, or because
access is rationed - then it does not provide adequate insurance for the poor.  On the other hand,
it is quite possible, and perhaps desirable, that a well-designed safety net operates at substantially
reduced levels during normal, non-crisis periods. 6
The  safety  net  should  not  provide  unduly  perverse  incentives  that  would  increase
unemployment or other forms of dependency on public support in the long run.  More generally,
the safety net should be efficient, in that, at the margin, money spent on it should be as effective
in raising the welfare of the poor as money spent on other programs.  These principles do not
necessarily mean the safety net must be finely targeted. Targeting is not as a rule costless, and so
there can be no presumption that the most  finely targeted safety net programs will have the
largest impact on poverty for a given outlay. 7
11Experience in a number of countries helps identify a combination of programs that satisfy
these principles and that have been effective in protecting the poor during crises: programs that
provide employment for those who are able to work, along with transfers for those who cannot,
or should not, work.  There is also a case for special credit programs, though design issues are
particularly important.
To mitigate the risk of loss of income, a key element of a public safety net is likely to be
a workfare program.  Past experience with workfare schemes suggests a number of guidelines
for designing a cost-effective program (Ravallion, 1999a). The program would provide work on
public  infrastructure projects to  people  seeking employment.  The work  should  ideally be
available at all times, but naturally expands during times of crisis as demand expands - thus
relying on administrative decisions less than other mechanisms.  The projects would be proposed
by local community groups, to ensure local relevance and ownership, and selected by a central
agency.  The central government should fund wage costs everywhere (possibly up to some limit
of, say, 15-20 days a month) and non-wage costs in designated poor areas. Good models for this
type of program are the Argentinean Trabajar Program for middle  income countries and the
Employment Guarantee Scheme in the state of Maharashtra in India for low-income countries.
A key to the success of such a workfare programn  is the wage rate.  A relatively low wage
rate ensures that only those in need apply, and that as many people as possible can be employed.
A low wage also protects the incentive to take up regular work when available.  The real wage
should be set no higher than 90 percent (say) of the wage rate for unskilled agricultural work
prevailing prior to the crisis.  If the crisis causes the real wage rate for unskilled labor to fall
temporarily, then the real workfare wage need not fall by as much as the market wage; this will
help smooth the welfare impact. However, if the crisis is expected to entail a lower long run real
wage rate, then the workfare wage will have to be based on an assessment of the sustainable
unskilled wage. This may be difficult; erring on the side of offering too low a wage may be safer
than setting too high a wage, as it is easier to increase the wage than to lower it. At the set wage,
the aim should be that all those who are willing to work should find work; if there is not enough
work for all, then the programn  would fail to provide a credible safety net.
12A  well  designed  workfare  program  will protect  the  poorest  workers  - those  willing  to
accept  low  wages  - against  declines  in labor  demand  and  loss  of income,  thus  mitigating  the
adverse  social  impact  of the crisis.
To  assure  that  those  unable  to  work  are covered,  and  to  mitigate  the  risk  of long-term
negative  effects  of  income  losses,  targeted  transfers  of  cash  or  food  would  be  provided  to
specific  sub-groups  of the  poor,  such  as pregnant  and  lactating  women  or the  elderly,  or those
who  should  not work,  such  as school-age  children.  These  programs  could  be turned  on  and  off,
or expanded,  based  on indicators  of crisis  - and  the demand  for work  in the  workfare  program
could  be  used  as  such  an  indicator.  There  are  a  number  of  examples  of  schlemes that  use
incentives  to  keep  children  in  school.  One  such program  is the  Bolsa  Escola  schleme in  Brazil,
which  offers  a scholarship  to families  who  send all their  children  to  school.  Another  is the  Food
for  Education  Program  in Bangladesh,  which  provides  rice targeted  to poor  families  (equivalent
to one fifth  of the child  wage rate) provided  their children  attend  85% of classes.  Other  examples
include  the  PROGRESA  scheme  in  Mexico  and  PRAF  in  Honduras.  Such  targeted  programs
would,  for  example,  mitigate  the impacts  of increases  in the cost  of education  and  prevent  long-
term losses  in educational  attainment  and earning  potential.
To  assist  in the recovery  after  a crisis,  a program  of carefully  targeted  micro-credit  and
savings  services  can  help  poor  people  preserve  or  re-acquire  productive  capital,  once
opportunities  appear.  During  a  crisis,  such a program  may  help  mitigate  the  risk  of permanent
losses in income-earning  capacity  by avoiding  distress  sales of productive  assets.  However,  care
must  be taken  to ensure  that  any credit  programs  are well-targeted  and used  for re-capitalization,
rather  than  as  alternatives  to  cash  transfers.  Grants  are  often  needed  instead  of  loans,  and
program  administrators  should  ensure  that  clients  understand  the  nature  of  the  assistance
received.  While  there  are concerns  about  the  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  micro-finance
schemes,  models  of successful  schemes  exist - for example  Grameen  and  BRAC  in Bangladesh
(Khandker,  1998).
All  of  these  programs  would  be  permanent,  dealing  with  issues  of  transient  poverty,
localized  shocks,  and poor-area  development  in normal  years,  but would  expand  during  times  of
crisis to assist  those temporarily  in need.  The budgetary  outlay  for  such a  set of programs  may
13be  higher than most  countries currently  spend, but  possibly lower  than  the  cost  of  hastily
prepared relief operations set up after a crisis.  In Indonesia, the cost of setting up a workfare
program  which  would  transfer  enough  income  to  the  poor  to  restore  pre-crisis  (1996)
consumption levels has been estimated at 3.5-5 percent of budgetary outlays (Manuelyan Atinc
and Walton, 1998).  Such amounts would probably be sufficient to fund programs such as those
described above.  To ensure that resources are available in the case of a nation-wide crisis, a fund
could be set up with regular payments to accumulate resources for crises during normal years.
4.  A CRISIS  HAS STARTED;  WHAT  SHOULD  BE DONE?
Concern  for  the  poor  should  guide  the  choice  of  responses  right  from  the  start.
Distributional concerns have to be taken into account in the design of policy responses including
both  the  basic  elements  of  a  stabilization  program,  and  the  micro-level  interventions
implemented of the reform program. Appropriate policies can help mitigate the impacts of a
crisis on the poor by preventing or dampening changes in the key variables that negatively affect
household incomes - prices, labor earnings, returns to  assets, public services. The case for a
policy change is strong when the adverse welfare impacts arise from the initial shocks.  When,
instead, the adverse welfare impacts are the result of a package of policy responses (such as the
elimination of a food subsidy as part of a general rationalization of public finances), one has to
be more careful.  Some policies that increase overall economic efficiency, and may lead to future
growth with positive long-term effects on the poor, may nevertheless imply short-term income
losses for them.  In these cases, wherever fiscally possible, the aim should be to compensate for
the  change through  a  less  distortionary, and  possibly  temporary, instrument,  rather than  to
prevent the efficiency-enhancing policy from being implemented. One recent  example is the
"bono solidaris" scheme in Ecuador, which aims to compensate the poor for losses associated
with the elimination of gas and electricity subsidies.
Policy can also help by identifying behavioral responses by households that can have
negative  long-term  impacts,  and  countering the  perverse  incentives that  lead  to  them.  For
example, where falling demand for adult labor raises the opportunity cost of keeping children in
14school, the introduction of the aforementioned transfer schemes contingent on school attendance
can effectively reduce the incentives for a household response with detrimental long-term effects.
An  agenda for  a  poverty-focused response to  a  crisis  should  include  the  following
actions:
*  Choose  macroeconomic  stabilization policies  that  achieve  their  nmacroeconomic
objectives at the least cost to the most vulnerable.
Macroeconomic policy has an important role to play in re-igniting growth and thereby
reducing poverty.  It is important to recognize that a country can not live beyond its means, and
that, in a typical crisis situation such as those with which this article has been concerned, some
expenditure reduction and switching must take place to reduce the current account  deficit to
levels which the rest  of the world is willing to  finance. This is the fundamental objective of
macroeconomic stabilization policies,  and it is  unhelpful to attempt to  "defend"  the poor by
blocking them. In general, some temporary reduction in aggregate demand is inevitable in these
situations.
However, as  soon as  a  sustainable external balance  has  been  reached  and  inflation
pressures are contained, macroeconomic policy should be  eased. Reducing interest  rates and
restoring efficient public spending as soon as this is sustainable can help offset the worst effects
of recession on the poor.
As we have seen, contractions in aggregate demand can have a particularly severe effect
on the poor,  largely by reducing demand for their main  asset: labor. Devaluations are more
ambiguous. They are reported to have had a generally pro-rural-poor impact in Africa in the
1980s, because  they raised the  competitiveness  of  the tradable  sector (Sahn  et.  al.,  1997).
Similarly, devaluations benefited net food and agricultural producers in East Asia.  But there was
also a separate effect on the aggregate level of economic activity.  The recent devaluations in
East Asia had  contractionary  consequences - stronger  than those  generally experienced  in
Africa, possibly because of their magnitude, and of the different level and structure of banking
and corporate foreign exchange liabilities. The devaluations contributed to the collapse of banks
and  companies  that  held imperfectly  hedged foreign-denominated debt,  and  thus  to  further
declines in economic activity.
15As the severity of the economic downturn in East Asia became apparent, the relaxation of
fiscal policies emerged as the appropriate macroeconomic, and poverty-alleviation, response and
became a key  element of internationally supported adjustment programs  in  1998 (notably in
Korea, Indonesia and Thailand).  A fiscal stimulus directed at labor-intensive activities such as
rural roads or other rural employment programns  can combine the benefits of growth with those of
income  support for poor groups. In choosing a combination of policies, policymakers should
always  try to  avoid high inflation, as the poor often rely on fixed incomes and hold  money
balances.
*  Ensure thatfiscal  adjustment protects the items of spending most important for the poor,
and that services are provided by effective, inclusive institutions.
Fiscal policies that protect spending on basic education and health can prevent cuts in
services which the poor use, and protect their ability to build up human capital. The elimination
of unproductive expenditures may help keep social spending at its pre-crisis levels. In education,
expenditures on primary schools, and on non-salary items, which are essential for quality, should
be maintained; targeted subsidies to reduce school drop-out rates among the poor (for example,
feeding  programs  or  scholarships  tied  to  attendance) should  also  be  increased.  In  health,
spending for activities with high externalities, such as vaccinations and vector control, as well as
spending for health care provision at the lower levels of the health system, should be maintained.
Beyond health and education, other public investments that affect the productivity of the
poor - most notably, investments in rural infrastructure, urban sanitation, and the provision of
micro-finance  - should  also  be  protected.  Wherever possible,  such  price  subsidies  as  are
deemed consistent with microeconomic efficiency should be targeted to the poor.  But experience
from Latin America suggests that a crisis may not the best time to reform existing subsidies, as
resistance from those hurt by the change may stop reforms.
For all public expenditures, especially those in the social sectors, it is important to assess
institutional capacity for the provision of programs.  No amount of public spending will benefit
the poor if corruption is rampant or if delivery mechanisms exclude the poor.
*  Set up or reinforce safety nets capable of providing effective insurance before a crisis
and assistance once a crisis hits.
16If programs exist that reach the poor and help them cope with the impact of the crisis, as
we argued in section 3, then they should clearly be supported or expanded.  In a short-run crisis
situation, the focus should be on programs that deliver the services the poor need (for example,
transfers to buy food), which reach the poor (even though they may reach some who are not
poor), and which are already running and can be scaled up quickly.  Examples of programs that
may be scaled up the aforementioned public works schemes and other workfare programs, which
can provide employment for the poor, and develop and maintain public assets in poor areas.
Expanding  unemployment assistance may  be  an  option in  countries  where  the  institutional
infrastructure for such a program is in place.
*  Set up interventions that help preserve the social fabric  of societies in crisis and build
social capital.
There is evidence that at least some of the negative social impacts of a crisis - rising
social tension and the breakdown in family and community ties - may persist after the end of
the crisis.  This was the case with violence in urban Latin America (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and
Loayza, 1998).  There is also growing anecdotal evidence that the cost of this higher level of
violence, both in direct human terns  and in terms of displaced or discouraged ecollomic activity,
can be quite high. It  is important not to neglect this policy area, where best  results may be
achieved through partnerships with local NGOs and civil society organizations in general.
*  Set up mechanisms to provide information for  monitoring the impact oJ the crisis and
evaluating responses.
Adequate and timely informnation  on the impact of the crisis on various groups and areas
helps design appropriate policy responses, and provides feedback on the impact of policies which
allows for corrections if the desired impact does not materialize.  Information can also play a
crucial role in national and local politics of design and implementation.  At a national level it is
of great importance that well-informed debate on issues, impacts and alternatives be supported.
Biased estimates of impact on the poor  - in  either direction - do not  foster sound policy
responses. 8 At a local level, provision of public information on intended public action - and the
rights of potential beneficiaries - can help reduce leakages and corruption.
17Sound program monitoring and  evaluation is difficult at the best of  times, but  crises
present extra problems.  One cannot reasonably ask a government and society in the midst of a
macroeconomic crises to  wait for a  baseline survey to  be done prior  to  intervention; nor  is
randomization normally a politically feasible option in such settings. Nonetheless, there are still
options for setting up rigorous impact evaluations in crises, such as by using propensity-score
matching methods to draw the comparison group (to a sample of program participants) from a
post-intervention  survey of non-participants.'  There is  also scope  for using  standard project
monitoring data for rapid evaluation purposes, such as by comparing the geographic distribution
of program spending with a suitably fine pre-existing poverty map (Ravallion, 1999b).
Three final observations are relevant in thinking about how such an agenda would be
implemented. First, institutional capacity constraints must be taken into account in the design of
policy responses. The extreme cases of post-conflict situations where the  state structure has
broken down and there are few NGOs or other organizations capable of implementing programs
pose a particular challenge. But even in more "normal" circumstances, a safety net program that
works well in one setting may be far less effective in another, where administrative capacity is
weak or financing is inadequate.
Second, action may have to be taken before sufficient information is available. There will
usually  be  inadequate  information  on  likely  and  actual  effects,  when  the  crisis  begins.
Nevertheless, those designing a response should simultaneously: (a) take immediate action based
on both readily available analysis and general principles, and (b) set up a process of generation of
information and diagnosis to inform future action. Often there will be greatest clarity on where to
move in the public spending and crisis monitoring domains.
Third, in order to be chosen and implemented, policy packages that protect the poor need
to  have  sufficient political  support.  If this  is  not present, such policies  are unlikely  to  be
implemented.  Crises may be times of opportunity to implement policies that lead to positive and
persistent distributional or social benefits, as they create a sense of urgency and a focus on the
plight  of the poorest, and as social unrest may threaten the fabric of society.  Whether such
opportunity can be seized will depend crucially both on the extent to which such reforms have
18been prepared prior to a crisis and on whether political dynamics allow governments or societal
actors to support changes against previously entrenched interests.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
Macroeconomic shocks  can affect  the  welfare of  poor  households  and  communities
through  changes  in  relative  prices,  changes  in  aggregate  labor  demand  (that  can  reduce
employment levels and/or wage rates), changes in the rates of returns on assets (including the
inflation tax), changes in public transfers (in cash and in kind); and changes in the community
enviromnent (be it in terms of public health or public safety). A number of these are painful
short-term effects, which are serious enough in their own right.  But  some are also associated
with undesirable long-term effects on poor people.
To minimize (short-run and long-run) negative effects on the poor, we proposed a two-
part agenda for public action.  The first part is about being prepared by having an effective and
efficient public  safety net in place  before the crisis.  Such a permanent safety  net should be
sufficiently flexible to adapt easily to changes in the level of demand for its services. In general,
this will imply that its outlays will be automatically counter-cyclical. We suggested that the basic
design of such a system would rely on three elements: a public employment guarantee or some
such workfare scheme; a set of targeted transfers (in kind and in cash) to those who can not or
should not work (such as pregnant or lactating women; the elderly; and school age children); and
targeted  micro-credit  and  savings schemes to  provide  the poor  with  access  to  capital  and
opportunities during and after the crisis.
The second part involves policies for dealing with a crisis that has already started. This
entails choosing macroeconomic policies which return to overall counter-cyclicality as soon as
sustainable  internal  and  extemal  macroeconomic  balances  are  restored;  managing  fiscal
expenditure reductions  selectively so as to  protect  items of  special  importance to  the poor;
reinforcing safety nets to deal with the extra demand for support; initiatives aimed at preserving
and  rebuilding  social  capital  in  poor  communities;  and  setting  up  adequate  information,
monitoring and evaluation systems.
19There is clearly much yet to be done to protect the poor from macroeconomic shocks.
There  is  a potentially  important role here  for the  international development community,  in
keeping with the now broad consensus that fighting poverty should be the overarching objective
of development assistance. Technical assistance in safety net design, monitoring and evaluation
can help greatly.  But it is evident that country incentives for sound policy making also matter. It
has long been accepted (as a matter of principle at least) that the inlternational  community should
not  bail  out  countries  that  get  into  a  macroeconomic  crisis  because  of  predictably  bad
macroeconomic policies.  Yet it seems that much less attention is paid to the safety net policies
that determine, in part, the welfare consequences of a macroeconomic crisis.  Even a country
with sound macroeconomic policies will face a severe external shock at one time or another.  If
that country's  government is not ready to help those who suffer from the shock then it is unclear
why  the  country  should  receive  any  more  help  from  the  international  community  than  a
government that adopts the wrong macroeconomic policies.  Either way, the poor suffer from bad
policy making.
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23NOTES
I  See, for example, the series of country studies discussed in Bourguignon et al. (1991).
2  On the determinants of crime in general see Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998).
Also see Moser (1997) on domestic violence in a community in Ecuador.
3  For  evidence  on  this  see  Robb  (1999)  and  Poppele  et  al.,  (1999);  primary  school
enrollment rates appear not to have declined during the crisis).
4  Examples of studies using applied general equilibrium models to  study the impacts of
macroeconomic crises and policy responses on income distribution include Demery and Demery
(199 1), Thorbecke (1991) and Decaluwe et al., (1999).
5  For an overview of specific policy alternatives see Dreze and Sen (1989) and Lipton and
Ravallion (1995, section 6).
6  We  focus here  on  the  insurance role  of  safety nets.  The  same  transfer  instruments
discussed here can also be used for redistribution across persons at different welfare levels. See
Klugman (1999) for further discussion of the redistribution roles of safety nets in developing and
transitional economies.
7  For a recent overview of the arguments and evidence on this  point see van  de Walle
(1999).
8  For example, while it is clear that many of Indonesia's poor suffered in the crisis of 1998,
the methods used in some of the most widely quoted early estimates of the impact on the poverty
rate almost certainly led to  an overestimate of the adverse impact (for further discussion see
Poppele et al., 1999).
9  Jalan and Ravallion (1999) give an example, based on Argentina's Trabqaar  Program.
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